First, let me thank you, Mr. Chairman, for

calling this hearing today. And I also want to note the trips that

you took, and Senators Corker and Isakson have recently taken to

the region. It’s been very helpful to the overall effort of keeping

this critical country on the agenda.

And I’ve felt for a long time, and been saying for a long time, as

you know, sir, that we needed a coordinated approach toward all

of Sudan, and shoring up the CPA must be a central component of

our policy. I’m very pleased that the administration has made this

a priority.

At the same time, Special Envoy Gration, as you know from our

meeting and my letter, I do have some concerns and questions

about the administration’s strategy. Thus far, in your public statements,

you’ve pushed a relatively new approach toward the Government

of Sudan, emphasizing engagement and incentives. I’d like

to know if this approach is linked to a more detailed strategy that’s

been agreed to by the interagency? And has this approach been

selected because Khartoum has demonstrated actual willingness to

cooperate and live up to its commitments, or is it more because

there just aren’t alternative options?

Well, I’m pleased that an attempt is being

made to create a real interagency strategy, but it does appear to

me that the constructive-engagement approach was engaged in

prior to this process being over, or being done and being ready to

go. So, I have some concerns about, sort of, leading with that before

the interagency process is complete.

So, I’d like to know, specifically, what tangible evidence have you

seen that Khartoum is actually acting in good faith?

I understand that rationale, but, of course,

the concern is that the message is possibly given to Khartoum that

they don’t have to do much at all in order to have that kind of constructive

engagement. So, I’d like you to say more—you’ve alluded

to this—about the stick side of this, not just the carrot side. I realize

you might not be able to go into specifics in an unclassified setting,

but can you assure this committee that the administration is

actively assessing the viability of meaningful punitive actions, and

preparing them, in the event that the Government of Sudan continues its historic footdragging? And, of course, that has been the

hallmark of their record.

Well, I—and I agree that that should, ideally,

be the approach, but will you commit to briefing us on the sort of

punitive or stick side of this, in the appropriate setting?

Well, I think it’s very important. We’re on a

tight timeline, as you said, with Southern Sudan’s scheduled vote

on secession just 18 months away, and we have to make sure that

those mechanisms are as much, or more, in place as the other

things you’ve mentioned, or I’m quite sure Khartoum will follow

their historical pattern.

Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I asked you and

asked Senator Kaufman for the courtesy of just 10 seconds to just

respond to the statements, both by Senator Corker and Senator

Isakson, with regard to Sudan’s counterterrorism cooperation.

I think these sort of characterizations are overstated and do not

state the actual situation. I’ve laid out my concerns in a classified

letter, and I’d be happy to repeat them in the appropriate setting.

I just would like the record to be clear. And I look forward to dialogue

with them on this.

Good.